Iran's top secret war plan, should push come to shove with the United States, certain European countries and Israel.The plan, which was drawn up primarily by the Revolutionary Guards and approved by Iran's delusional president, consists of 5 main strategies:
(1) The removal of Iranian funds (already begun) from all foreign banks where those funds could be seized as a result of sanctions and war;
(2) The destruction of oil facilities in Gulf states hosting US forces or otherwise friendly to the US, and the mining of the Persian Gulf, in order to drive oil prices above $100/barrel and adversely effect financial markets;
(3) The weakening of US and European national resolve to win a war against Iran by causing massive US and European casualties requiring deployment of reinforcing forces, attacking into Iraq and the Gulf waters with conventional forces and weapons (such as ballistic missiles), the possible use of chemical and biological weapons on the Iraqi battlefield, and a massive increase in the number and level of terrorist attacks within Iraq (for which Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have been laying the groundwork since the spring of 2003);
(4) The use of "Fifth Column" forces against US, European and Israeli targets, with the forces consisting of terrorist cells from Hamas and Islamic Jihad, with which Iranian President Ahmadinejad met on 20 January 2006 in Syria, and;
(5) The attacking of Israel with ballistic missiles, possibly with the aid of Syria, with the intent of causing great damage to Tel Aviv, Haifa and other major Israeli cities, and the destruction of Israel’s nuclear weapons facility at Dimona, which the Iranians hope will spread radiation across a wide area.
Iran's plan is "clever, asymmetric and 100% effective in accomplishing all their goals. It is also way outside of the proverbial box that the Americans and the E.U. are willing to fight in. An is especially interesting side note is that it has the approval of President Ahmadinejad, who is believed to be quite delusional and perhaps clinically insane. Iran's President Ahmadinejad, is without a doubt a fanatical lunatic is search of nuclear arms. He also truly believes in the inevitablity of an impending apocalypse. One in which HE is the Re-incarnation of a 10th Century Muslim messiah returned from the dead.
Bobby Anding
robertda333@gmail.com
Friday, January 27, 2006
Thursday, January 26, 2006
Tick..Tock..goes the Atomic clock...
Russia has been aggressively pursuing construction of several massive underground facilities. The largest being at Yamantau Mountain and the city of Mezhgorye (formerly the settlements of Beloretsk-15 and Beloretsk-16). A current copy of the Russia's federal budget lists the project as a closed territory containing installations of the Ministry of Defense.
On April 16, 1996, the New York Times
"In a secret project reminiscent of the chilliest days of the Cold War, Russia is building a mammoth underground military complex in the Ural Mountains, Western officials and Russian witnesses say.
"Hidden inside Yamantau mountain in the Beloretsk area of the southern Urals, the project involved the creation of a huge complex, served by a railroad, a highway, and thousands of workers."
The complex, being built inside Yamantau mountain by tens of thousands of workers, covers an area the size of the Washington area inside the Beltway.
There are reportedly provisions for living inside the man-made caves. There is an underground warehouse for food and clothing, a shelter for the Russian national leadership in case of nulcear war, and rumors that the Yamantau Mountain project was associated with the so-called 'Dead Hand' nuclear retaliatory command and control system for strategic missiles.
Most American C.I.A. analysts believe the secret underground complex beneath Yamantau Mountain states firmly that the Russian military is preparing to fight and win a Nuclear war!
Priors on the Record
It is now known that the Soviet Union used secret underground bases in Eastern Europe to conceal nuclear missiles at the end of the Cold War, as an integral part of its nuclear war-fighting strategy. In all, some 73 SS-23 missiles, packing a nuclear punch 365 times the bomb that detonated over Hiroshima, were hidden by the Soviets in violation of the INF Treaty, which went into force in June 1988.
If war had broken out those missiles would have given the Soviets an overwhelming strategic advantage against the United States, allowing them to decimate NATO forces in Europe in a surprise attack. 'Supposedly...' The last of these missiles will be destroyed by the government of Slovakia, under a grant from the United States.
Today, Russia IS conducting nuclear deception on a far vaster scale beneath Yamantau Mountain, where it has dug out a gigantic underground military complex designed to withstand a sustained nuclear assault. A U.S. intelligence source was quoted as saying that the Yamantau complex is one of over 200 secret deep underground nuclear war-fighting sites in Russia.
What causes the West concern is that many of these secret sites have been significantly upgraded over the past six years at a cost of billions of dollars.
U.S. intelligence sources believe the Russian government has pumped more than $6 billion into Yamantau alone, in preparation for a surprise attack on Western forces. What other reason could there be to construct a sprawling underground complex that spans some 400 square miles? Especalliy, when the Russian economy is under severe duress.
In 1998, in a rare public comment, then-Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Gen. Eugene Habinger, called Yamantau "a very large complex -- we estimate that it has millions of square feet available for underground facilities. It has only one purpose and that is to survive and win a nuclear war with the United States."
It is believed to be large enough to house 60,000 persons, with a special air filtration system designed to withstand a nuclear, chemical or biological attack. Enough food and water is believed to be stored at the site to sustain the entire underground population for months on end.
"The only use for this site is a post-nuclear war command and control center" --- Rep. Roscoe Bartlett said recently. Bartlett is one of the handful of members of Congress who have closely followed the Yamantau project.
The Yamantau Mountain complex is located close to one of Russia's remaining nuclear weapons labs, Chelyabinsk-70, giving rise to speculation it could house either a nuclear warhead storage site, a missile base, a secret nuclear weapons production center, a directed energy laboratory or a buried command post. Whatever it is, Yamantau was designed to survive a nuclear war.
In response to repeated U.S. inquiries, the Russian government has provided no fewer than 12 separate and contradictory explanations for the site, none of them believed to be credible.
A 1997 Congressional Research Service report said that the vast sums invested to build the Yamantau Mountain complex "provide evidence of excessive military modernization in Russia."
"It is only a matter of time before Russia/China attacks the United States....." says Bobby Anding, a well conected Washington insider.
Russia is pouring money into this and other underground nuclear sites at the same time U.S. taxpayers have provided billions of dollars in aid to Russia to help dismantle nuclear warheads taken off line as a result of START I and START II.
"Yamantau Mountain is the largest post-attack nuclear-secure project in the world... They have very large train tracks running in and out of it, with enormous rooms carved inside the mountain. It has been built to resist more then half dozen DIRECT nuclear hits, one right after the other. It's very disquieting that the Russians are doing this when they don't have $200 million to build the service module on the international space station and can't pay housing for their own military people," ---Rep. Bartlett.
The Russians have constructed two entire cities over the site, known as Beloretsk 15 & 16, which are closed to the public, each with 30,000 workers. No foreigner has ever set foot near the site. A U.S. military attaché stationed in Moscow was turned back when he attempted to visit the region a few years ago.
Neither the Central Intelligence Agency nor the Defense Intelligence Agency will comment on what the Russians are doing at Yamantau Mountain.
"There's not a lot we could say without venturing into the classified realm," CIA spokesman Mike Mansfield said. "It's hard to discuss it with any specificity." Though Bobby Anding has stated in print that the Atomic clock is ticking with the United States running out of time.
The little that is known about the site comes from Soviet-era intelligence officers, who defected to Great Britain and the United States. In public testimony before a House Armed Services Subcommittee last October, KGB defector Col. Oleg Gordievsky said the KGB had maintained a separate, top-secret organization, known as Directorate 15, to build and maintain a network of underground command bunkers in preparation for a planned offensive aganist the United States.
"And what is interesting was that President Vladimir Putin and Russia's military leaders are using those facilities, and the same service is still running the same facility, like it was 10, 15 years ago." --- Col. Oleg Gordievsky
Yamantau Mountain is so secret that only a handful of Russian government officials knows about it, says Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa., who speaks Russian and travels frequently to Russia, chairing a congressional working group that discusses strategic issues with counterparts from the Russian Duma.
"I ask the Russians about it every time I meet with them... We've never had a straight answer."
Weldon got interested in Yamantau Mountain in 1995 when he saw a public report suggesting it was a vast mining project.
"I went to Moscow and spoke with the deputy interior minister who was in charge of mining," Weldon says. "I asked him if there was any mining activity there. He just shook his head and said he had never heard of it. So I mentioned the other name the Russians use for it: Mezhgorye. He said he hadn't heard of that either. Then he sent an aide out to check. Twenty minutes later, the aide came back, visibly shaken. He said they couldn't say anything about it."
Weldon also met with Andrei Kokoshkin, a former deputy defense minister, in charge of President Yeltsin's National Security Council.
"Kokoshkin called it a public works project, and said there was nothing to worry about, since the Defense Ministry had no involvement in it. So I brought out a copy of the Defense Ministry's budget -- it's only a few pages long -- and showed him the line item for Mezhgorye. He smiled and said it must be for bridges, roads and schools. When I then asked if I could see it, he said that could only be arranged through Putin. The site was controlled directly by the president."
Weldon then tried sending a 3-page letter to Putin in Russian.
"I told him all the things I was trying to do to foster better U.S.-Russia understanding, but said that I couldn't help if they couldn't clear up something as important as this. He never replied."
Where's the Money Coming From?
The cause for concern is that the US is currently sending many Billions of dollars to Russia, supposedly to help that country dismantle old nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the Russian parliament has been complaining that it cannot pay $250 million in back wages owed to its workers at the same time that it is spending money to comply with new strategic arms reduction treaties.
Aviation Week and Space Technology reported that "It seems the nearly $30 billion a year spent on intelligence hasn't answered the question of what the Russians are up to at Yamantau Mountain in the Urals. The huge underground complex being built there has been the object of U.S. interest since 1992. 'We don't know exactly what it is,' says Ashton Carter, the Pentagon's international security mogul. The facility is not operational, and the Russians have offered 'nonspecific reassurances' that it poses no threat to the U.S."
The following is an excerpt from an interview between Chris Ruddy and Col. Stanislav Lunev, a Russian military intelligence officer who defected in 1992. Col. Stanislav Lunev is the highest-ranking military intelligence officer ever to have defected from Russia.
You ask about Yamantau Mountain. Well, this is a huge underground city, which could be used in time when many Russian cities are destroyed, but the Russian military and political elite will survive and live until our planet will try to restore itself.
Bobby Anding at his most recent round table discussion stated that "American funds ARE subsidizing a Russian (WMD) factory? Banging his hand on the table he added further....
"The Americans are placing the down payment for their own demise..."
Bobby Anding
Wednesday, January 25, 2006
Wave Information Technologies and emanation of high frequency
Expert on anomalous phenomena and author of many books about miracles Igor Vinokurov tells a story he learnt from an acquaintance of his, a retired police colonel. The head of one of the key departments in a Moscow research institute suddenly died. The man was known for his trouble-making nature and lack of respect towards colleagues and subordinates. One day, the boss advanced some harsh and insulting remark in the address of a subordinate. The latter said nothing but his glance was so sinister that the boss suddenly dropped the head on the desk and began to rattle. When doctors arrived they had to verify death of the man but could not explain the reason why the healthy man died so suddenly.
A pathologist who performed the autopsy said that the heart of the dead man had been stopped by some force the way a human hand may stop a pendulum from swinging. Investigators of the sudden death supposed that the subordinate offended by the boss was probably the force that killed the man. Indeed, his sinister and gloomy glance gave police officers creeps
It was known long ago that people may have murderous glances. A really sensational story occurred in the beginning of the past century in Paris. Opera singer Massol known by the manner to frown all the time and having gloomy nature was incredibly popular at the Italian Imperial Opera at that time. Once he was singing the Damnation aria in an opera by Halevy with the eyes upraised. At that very moment a technician shifting scenery above the scene fell down and died in an instant. Next time the singer stopped his glance on a bandmaster. The man felt immediately unwell and died of an unusual nervous attack in a couple of days. Massol was told to look at an empty box where nobody was expected to seat at the theatre while singing next time. But later it turned out that a merchant from Marseilles had a ticket to the box but for some reason took the seat only when the performance already began. The merchant died next day after the performance. After so many tragic deaths caused by the gloomy glance of the singer, the opera was excluded from the repertoire once and for all. Singer Massol quitted the scene soon.
Indian yogis and Tibetan magus indulge in long training and get the gift known as Vashitva that helps them tame and even kill wild animals. Consummate animal trainers say they can stop animals with a glance only and pronounce no words at that.
A well-known Russian extrasensory Rosa Kuleshova can see objects at a distance of three meters and read enveloped letters with her eyes closed. This phenomenon proves that the human glance can be penetrative, when humans can look through opaque objects.
Historians say that Russian writer Leo Tolstoy X-rayed people when talking to them. The glance of Joseph Stalin could paralyze people's will and made them lower their gaze. Some people may even have an impact on photographic films. In presence of a special committee, an American man named as Ted Sirius fixed his eyes on a picture to memorize its every detail and then shifted the eyes to a photographic plate. When the film was developed the committee found a vague picture resembling the original one. Later, experts registered similar phenomena with people suffering from strong visual hallucinations.
To know the secret of putting an evil eye upon others, Igor Vinokurov decided to find out more details from a real witch. He met an old woman named Tamara in a god-forsaken village in Russia's Vladimir Region who was rumored to be capable of putting an evil eye on people. Contrary to the general idea of a witch Vinokurov saw a woman that looked like a good fair with a round face, turned-up nose and blue eyes.
The woman said it was easy to bedevil someone. "Just imagine someone whom you dislike being ill or dead, and make the fancy particularly vivid. Then closely watch the object of dislike when coming across him and curse him in your mind," the woman confessed.
Researchers wanted to see how the recommendation works in the laboratory environment. Doctor of physical sciences, a bioenergetics therapist Oleg Dubov affected a portion of distilled water in a sealed ampoule with the force of his mind. When physical characteristics of the water were measured the researcher was surprised to know that the water molecule mobility and the water conductivity increased.
In old times when people believed that putting an evil eye on somebody was a really strong weapon in the hands of people known as witches there was a list of diseases that could probably be caused by basilisk glances. Such glances were believed to be so strong that they made adults suffer from leanness, tumors, paralysis, convulsions, blindness, gluttony or impotence. Evil-eyed people suffer from insomnia, nausea, headache and epilepsy. The bedeviled people feel instinctual fear before the above-mentioned symptoms begin to show. Then, a curse reveals itself it yellowish or grayish complexion, stomachache and continuous vomit.
Director of the Wave Information Technologies Institute, Vladimir Hokkanen, says that a glance can be really murderous or at least health-destructive. Indeed, numerous experiments proved that the human glance is a source of a strong biological impulse. Eyes emit emanation of high frequency and thus can affect other people. This explains why many of us can sense an intent look of a person following us.
A member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Biology Grant Demirchoglyan, says that like any unique optoelectronic system the human eye both receives and emits signals. The return radiation going from the eye is the short-wave one and thus can be as penetrating as X-rays or a laser. It may influence the central nervous system, the brain and the whole body in general. If experts tentatively prove that the power of human eyes is of the same nature as that of a laser, we will have to believe that fictitious characters able to burn a human being to ashes actually exist.
A pathologist who performed the autopsy said that the heart of the dead man had been stopped by some force the way a human hand may stop a pendulum from swinging. Investigators of the sudden death supposed that the subordinate offended by the boss was probably the force that killed the man. Indeed, his sinister and gloomy glance gave police officers creeps
It was known long ago that people may have murderous glances. A really sensational story occurred in the beginning of the past century in Paris. Opera singer Massol known by the manner to frown all the time and having gloomy nature was incredibly popular at the Italian Imperial Opera at that time. Once he was singing the Damnation aria in an opera by Halevy with the eyes upraised. At that very moment a technician shifting scenery above the scene fell down and died in an instant. Next time the singer stopped his glance on a bandmaster. The man felt immediately unwell and died of an unusual nervous attack in a couple of days. Massol was told to look at an empty box where nobody was expected to seat at the theatre while singing next time. But later it turned out that a merchant from Marseilles had a ticket to the box but for some reason took the seat only when the performance already began. The merchant died next day after the performance. After so many tragic deaths caused by the gloomy glance of the singer, the opera was excluded from the repertoire once and for all. Singer Massol quitted the scene soon.
Indian yogis and Tibetan magus indulge in long training and get the gift known as Vashitva that helps them tame and even kill wild animals. Consummate animal trainers say they can stop animals with a glance only and pronounce no words at that.
A well-known Russian extrasensory Rosa Kuleshova can see objects at a distance of three meters and read enveloped letters with her eyes closed. This phenomenon proves that the human glance can be penetrative, when humans can look through opaque objects.
Historians say that Russian writer Leo Tolstoy X-rayed people when talking to them. The glance of Joseph Stalin could paralyze people's will and made them lower their gaze. Some people may even have an impact on photographic films. In presence of a special committee, an American man named as Ted Sirius fixed his eyes on a picture to memorize its every detail and then shifted the eyes to a photographic plate. When the film was developed the committee found a vague picture resembling the original one. Later, experts registered similar phenomena with people suffering from strong visual hallucinations.
To know the secret of putting an evil eye upon others, Igor Vinokurov decided to find out more details from a real witch. He met an old woman named Tamara in a god-forsaken village in Russia's Vladimir Region who was rumored to be capable of putting an evil eye on people. Contrary to the general idea of a witch Vinokurov saw a woman that looked like a good fair with a round face, turned-up nose and blue eyes.
The woman said it was easy to bedevil someone. "Just imagine someone whom you dislike being ill or dead, and make the fancy particularly vivid. Then closely watch the object of dislike when coming across him and curse him in your mind," the woman confessed.
Researchers wanted to see how the recommendation works in the laboratory environment. Doctor of physical sciences, a bioenergetics therapist Oleg Dubov affected a portion of distilled water in a sealed ampoule with the force of his mind. When physical characteristics of the water were measured the researcher was surprised to know that the water molecule mobility and the water conductivity increased.
In old times when people believed that putting an evil eye on somebody was a really strong weapon in the hands of people known as witches there was a list of diseases that could probably be caused by basilisk glances. Such glances were believed to be so strong that they made adults suffer from leanness, tumors, paralysis, convulsions, blindness, gluttony or impotence. Evil-eyed people suffer from insomnia, nausea, headache and epilepsy. The bedeviled people feel instinctual fear before the above-mentioned symptoms begin to show. Then, a curse reveals itself it yellowish or grayish complexion, stomachache and continuous vomit.
Director of the Wave Information Technologies Institute, Vladimir Hokkanen, says that a glance can be really murderous or at least health-destructive. Indeed, numerous experiments proved that the human glance is a source of a strong biological impulse. Eyes emit emanation of high frequency and thus can affect other people. This explains why many of us can sense an intent look of a person following us.
A member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Biology Grant Demirchoglyan, says that like any unique optoelectronic system the human eye both receives and emits signals. The return radiation going from the eye is the short-wave one and thus can be as penetrating as X-rays or a laser. It may influence the central nervous system, the brain and the whole body in general. If experts tentatively prove that the power of human eyes is of the same nature as that of a laser, we will have to believe that fictitious characters able to burn a human being to ashes actually exist.
Tuesday, January 24, 2006
The Iran nuclear question....
1/20/2006
I wanted to know for myself just how scary is the Iran question? I wanted to know the answer to several questions in relation to an Atomically able Iran. What will it take for Iran to build a Nuclear Bomb? What if Iran already has a bomb, how will they deliver it? UPS? If Iran is not only capable of building a Bomb what can be done to stop them from completing it?
Let’s look at the facts….
A middle of the road view by both the American Department of Defense and the British Office of Special Operations believe that Iran is probably a little less than a decade away from developing a nuclear weapon. That is unless they receive help from an outside source.
The core issue is how long it will take Iran to enrich a few tens of kilograms of uranium to more than 90 percent U-235. Dafna Linzer reported that the US Intelligence Community does not believe that Iran could do so before “early to mid next decade” A questionable revision of previous assessments by the Bush Administration. Previously, it was believed that Iran would “have the ability to produce nuclear weapons in the later part of this decade.” Why the wait? The answer is that Iran has yet to build, install and begin operating its centrifuges to enrich Uranium. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein at the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) released an estimate that breaks down the steps for Iran to make fissile material for a bomb.
Hurdles in Building a Centrifuge Plant
A key part of the development of Iran’s gas centrifuge program is the operation of a 164-machine cascade at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Facility (PFEP) at Natanz, Iran. The installation of the first such test cascade was finished in the fall of 2003 but it never operated with uranium hexafluoride prior to the start of the suspension in November of 2003. It was not operated during the suspension. Until the start of the suspension, Iran had used uranium hexafluoride in single machine tests and a small cascade of 19 machines. Several of these tests encountered problems.
To operate this cascade at the pilot facility, Iran needs to take several steps before it can introduce uranium hexafluoride into the system. It first has to repair or replace any damaged centrifuges. According to IAEA reports, about 30% of the centrifuges crashed or broke when the cascade was shut down at the start of the suspension. In addition, Iran disconnected some of the pipes and exposed the pipes to humidity which could have caused corrosion. After making necessary repairs, Iran then has to finish connecting all the pipes, establish a vacuum inside the cascade, start the process of turning on the centrifuges and then running them under vacuum for several weeks, and prepare the cascade for operation with uranium hexafluoride. Iran may start enriching uranium in a subset of this cascade sooner, but it could take two or more months to ready the whole cascade for the use of uranium hexafluoride. If Iran does not encounter any significant problems, such as excessive vibration of the centrifuges or leakage of the vacuum, Iran could then introduce uranium hexafluoride into the entire cascade and start enriching uranium. Iran would want to operate the cascade for several more months to ensure that no significant problems develop and gain confidence that it can operate the cascade with uranium hexafluoride. Absent major problems, Iran will need roughly six months to one year to demonstrate successful operation of this cascade.
Once Iran overcomes the last technical hurdle of operating its test cascade, it can duplicate it and create larger cascades. Iran would then be ready to build a centrifuge plant able to produce significant amounts of enriched uranium either for peaceful purposes or for nuclear weapons.
The PFEP can hold a total of six, 164-machine cascades for a total of about 1000 machines, although Iran may build fewer cascades or change the number of centrifuges per cascade. Without major modifications, this facility is unlikely to be used to make significant amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons.
The Fuel Enrichment Plant
Iran has indicated to the IAEA that it plans to start industrial scale operations soon, which likely means that it plans to install centrifuges or related equipment in the underground buildings of the main Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). Until the end of the suspension, Iran had not installed any centrifuges at the FEP, where it plans eventually to install about 50,000 machines. It plans to install the centrifuges in modules of 3,000 machines that would be designed to produce low enriched uranium for power reactors. In a case where just 1,500 of these centrifuges were installed and optimized to produce HEU, these centrifuges could produce enough highly enriched uranium for about one nuclear weapon per year. When completed, the FEP could be used to produce roughly 500 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium annually. At 15-20 kilograms per weapon, that would be enough for 25-30 nuclear weapons per year.
Time to the Bomb
It is difficult to estimate how long it would take Iran to be able to build its first nuclear weapon, assuming Iran makes such a decision. The key to predicting a timetable is understanding the pace and scope of Iran's gas centrifuge program. Prior to the November 2004 suspension, Iran had an estimated 700 assembled centrifuges that were in good
condition and usable in centrifuge cascade. Also, Iran has enough disassembled parts for more than a thousand additional P-1 centrifuges. At past rates of production, Iran can make and assemble about 70-100 centrifuges per month, and could therefore have a total of 1,300-1,600 centrifuges by late 2006, if they resume centrifuge manufacturing in January 2006. Combining all these centrifuges into cascades, installing control equipment, building feed and withdrawal systems, and testing the plant would take at least another year.
Given another year to make enough HEU for a nuclear weapon and a few more months to convert the uranium into weapon components, Iran could have its first nuclear weapon in 2009. By this time, Iran is assessed to have had sufficient time to prepare the other components of a nuclear weapon, although the weapon may not be deliverable by a ballistic missile.
This result reflects a worst case assessment, and thus is highly uncertain. Though some analysts at the IAEA believe that Iran could assemble centrifuges quicker, other analysts, including those in the US intelligence community, appear to believe that a date of 2009 would be overly optimistic. They believe that Iran is likely to encounter technical difficulties that would significantly delay bringing a centrifuge plant into operation. Factors causing delay include Iran having trouble making so many centrifuges in that time period or it taking longer than expected to overcome difficulties in operating the cascades or building a centrifuge plant. As to Iran being only months away from a bomb are really statements about how close Iran will be once it completes the FEP—something, as you will soon see, that will take a few years.
So, How Long in real world figures?
Iran plans to house about 50,000 centrifues in the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz in order to produce low enriched uranium for a notional civil nuclear power program. The output of a centrifuge is measured in “seperative work units”—a measure of the amount of work required to enrich a given amount (product) uranium. In math:
Separative work per unit of product = V(XP) – V (XW) – F/P *[V(XF) – V(XW)]
V(S) = (2*S – 100) * LOG (S/(100-S)]
F/P = (XP- XW)/(XF-XW), where
XF = feed assay (W/O)XP = product assay (W/O)XW = tails assay (W/O)V = separation potentialS = XF, XP, or XWF/P = feed to product ratio
So, how much SWU is required to produce 25 kg of HEU (a few thousand depending on some technical factors). Each of Iran’s centrifuges has an output between 2-3 SWU/year. Iran plans a that the full scale FEP at Natanz will house 50,000 centrifuges, giving the plant a capacity of 150,000 SWU/year—enough for annual reloads of LEU for the Bushehr reactor. So the answer in laymens terms is 25-30 nuclear weapons worth of HEU material per production year.
Of course, those are Iran’s “admitted” physical assets and production capabilities. The United States C.I.A. believes that Iran is closer to possessing about 700+ centrifuges, as well as components for another 1,000.
So, the real question, however, is how quickly Iran could assemble and operate 1,500 centrifuges in a crash program to make enough HEU for one bomb (say 15-20 kg).
Albright and Hinderstein have created a notional timeline for such a program:
1) Assemble 1,300-1,600 centrifuges. Assuming Iran starts assembling centrifuges at a rate of 70-100/month, Iran will have enough centrifuges in 6-9 months.
2)Combine centrifuges into cascades, install control equipment, building feed and withdrawal systems, and test the Fuel Enrichment Plant. 1 year
3)Enrich enough HEU for a nuclear weapon. 1 year
4)Weaponize the HEU. A “few” months.
If Iran receives no help and is NOT hindered in anyway by the International community total time to a fully functioning Nuclear bomb is about three years. This timeline is a worst case scenario which assumes Iran encounters no significant material or scientific problems along the way.
Let’s examine some of the problems Iran may run into
One technical problem—the inability of Iran to make relatively pure uranium hexafluoride (“hex”) to be fed into centrifuges for enrichment. Before introducing UF6 into a centrifuge cascade, the Iranians must rid the gas of impurities like MoF6 or the impurities will plug cascade piping, crashing Iran’s centrifuges. Iran is having a big problem purifying hex at its Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) near Esfahan, Iran’s inability at making hex in part because the Clinton Administration convinced the Chinese to stop building the UCF. Dr Mohammad Saeidi, AEOI deputy for planning and international affairs, stated that the impact of the Chinese cut-off was a knee-blow to Iran’s Nuclear program. Iran also has had significant problems in the area of utilizing pulse columns to purify uranium.
The length of time it will take Iran to get it’s act together on these important technical issues is up in the air. There is a wide variety of estimates among intelligence services. Intelligence analysts do not agree on how long it will take Iran to solve current process chemical problems at its restarted Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Isfahan.
These difficulties have thus far prevented Iran from producing uncontaminated uranium hexafluoride (UF6) feedstock for its gas centrifuge enrichment program. Last month, as Iran prepared to operate the plant, Vienna officials said that Iran would require “at least several months” to address its problems (NF, 15 Aug., 1).
According to Israeli government analysts now examining related technical issues, it may take Iran two or three months to begin producing pure UF6. According to U.K. government experts, however, Iran may need about 18 months to do that.
One thing government analysts do agree on, is that the higher the enrichment level sought by Iran from its gas centrifuges, the more critical it will be for Iran to first eliminate technical problems associated with producing pure UF6. Despite sound bite hysteria Iran faces a serious number of technical hurdles before it can simply start churning out fissile material. Those real world challenges are going to years to solve.
The real ‘Wild Card’ in this mix has to be the Russian factor
The Russian government presently has a proposal on the table which would have Iran transfer to Russia its uranium for enrichment. However, this process can be used to make weapons-grade nuclear fuel. Under the Russian proposal, Iran would be allowed to continue to convert uranium ore at it’s Isfahan facility provided it then shipped it to Russia for enrichment.
The problem with this is that the Russians have also agreed to sell more than $1 billion worth of missiles and other defense systems to Iran. When interviewed by the Russian Tass news agency the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Mikhail Kamynin, did not comment on specifics, saying in a statement only that they were "exclusively defensive weapons." Kamynin also added that the sales fully complied with nonproliferation commitments and Russian law. Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council stated that "Iran's and Russia's military cooperation is not a complicated issue. We are two sovereign nations engaged in combating US aggression."
The Iranians have officially downplayed the deal, telling the Islamic Republic News Agency on Saturday that Iran buys arms from many countries and would not under any circumstances stop.
What is known is that in November 2005 the Russian air Defense Ministry would transfer up to 30 Tor-M1 missile systems to Iran over the next two years. The C.I.A. has said the Tor-M1 system could identify up to 48 targets and fire at two targets simultaneously at a height of up to 20,000 feet. This specific surface to air weapon system is not capable of becoming a delivery vehicle for any Nuclear weapons systems. It is however the perfect weapon system for deterring U.S., Israeli, and European Union air strikes. With this Surface to Air (SAM) capabilities the Iranian Nuclear bomb program could go forward without any real threat of being shut down by air strikes. The Iranians know with this vital lynch pin removed the American arsenal an armed military response is unlikely. Any coalition response after the delivery of the Russian made Surface to Air missiles would have to include some type of armed invasion. This is something that both the E.U. and the American public have stated publicly would NOT support.
Delivery capability of the Iranians
Tehran has a large number of short range ballistic missiles (100-500 km range) like the CSS-8, Scud module B and Scud module C. Each can carry heavy payloads and reach targets very close to Iran. Though, they are famously inaccurate even for nuclear weapons.
Iran’s long range missiles which are capable of hitting American, Canadian, and the European continent, is the Shahab 3. The long range Shahab 3 missile is essentially an extended-range (1,300) version of the North Korean Na Dong missile. The American C.I.A. believes that Iran is most certainly developing an even longer range (2,000) km module B version the Na Dong missile. The Shahab-3 will be capable of carrying a 1,650-pound warhead; the Shahab-4 will include improved guidance components and can travel up to 1,240 miles with a warhead weighing up to 2,200 pounds.
The payload capacity is an very important factor is a ‘crash’ program such as Iran is under taking. Since we are talking about a crash program here—let’s assume that whatever Iran builds will not be tested except under what we might call “operational circumstances.”
Iran’s nuclear program is based around uranium, which can be made critical either by slamming a uranium pellet into a nearly critical mass of uranium (a gun-type device like we dropped on Hiroshima) or imploding sphere of uranium (like the Chinese did in the 1960s). The latter is the more likely route for a number of reasons, largely related to the size of the weapon. Since we are talking about a ballistic missile delivered weapon, let’s assume Iran goes the implosion route.
If past results are the benchmark then the most likely scenario of a new state producing it’s first (WMD) uranium based weapon would be a weight of 450-1000 kg, with a far heavier design more likely.
That’s pretty consistent with what we see from other nuclear states in their infancy. For example China’s first bomb—a uranium implosion device—weighed 1550 kg and had to be towed to the tower with a bulldozer.
What’s interesting is the Shahab-4 now has a modified nose section allowing it to hold a larger warhead and thus provide additional room for a nuclear device. Such extra room is vital as Iranian nuclear engineers would face major technical challenges in making the country’s first nuclear weapon light enough and small enough to fit on its existing missiles, particularly without benefit of having conducted full-scale nuclear weapons tests.
Israeli officials have said the larger nose section is capable of separation and visually appears similar to that used on the Russian SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile. “It is not a copy of a known missile but the old Shahab-4 with major-league design changes. It’s clear that the new capability is the work of a team of highly seasoned missile engineers. With all facts pointing to a Russian design team rather than beginners luck,”
As far as current delivery capabilities of Iran to deliver a nuclear weapon, the outside best that Iran could hope for is maybe an Israeli city. Even that would be at the extreme edge of their missile delivery capabilities.
Western/Coalition Intervention
Can the West stop, slow down, or end Iran’s nuclear ambitions by armed intervention? The benchmark to the question would be the Israeli bombing operation conducted against Iraq’s in 1981. That armed intervention was successful in curtailing Iraq’s (WMD) program. Current available data suggests that Iran’s (WMD) production facilities are too spread out to allow a one sortie strike like the one Israel conducted against Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981. While Iran’s facilities are more spread out, there are key assets are highly vulnerable to Coalition air strikes. A properly timed and delivered bombing campaign would most certainly delay Iran’s (WMD) program by a few years.
Though, the time gained by armed intervention would be severely offset by unintended and unseen consequences. Such as partial or complete solidarity of the entire Mid-East Islamo-Fascist regimes which at the present are fractious with in fighting and religious differences.
If the available data bears out and Iran’s (WMD) program is not capable of operation in the seeable future then the case for military interdiction does not bear out. I do believe that the current administration in Iran folded into the modern climate of ‘State-less, Face-less’ terrorism makes an ‘Atomic Iran’ a very scary prospect. Bearing all the facts in mind I do believe that alternative avenues should be sought in stopping Iran from both building and needing an nuclear bomb. One scenario that would be acceptable to the West would be changing the administration in Iran to one more friendly and peace oriented. Another avenue might be economic incentives or sanctions such as has been used with North Korea. Added to that much of Iran’s reactor facilities are not even finished construction.
That might buy some additional time — but for what?
The result will likely be an Iranian nuclear program outside of IAEA safeguards. An Iranian bomb is not, yet, a foregone conclusion. The fact that Iran’s nuclear program has become an hot potato domestic issue points to the existence of doves among the Islamic hardliners. Though as the West continues galvanizing support for an armed response Iran’s hardliners will only push forward the (WMD) bomb program at all costs. This is where economic incentives in the form of carrot and stick talks might be very fruitful.
I believe that an armed incursion at this time is not warranted. Any such action would seriously inhibit the secularists within the Iranian parliament from achieving a less confrontational stance. A more middle of the road approach is the answer from both sides.
Bobby Anding
rebel@acadiacom.net
I wanted to know for myself just how scary is the Iran question? I wanted to know the answer to several questions in relation to an Atomically able Iran. What will it take for Iran to build a Nuclear Bomb? What if Iran already has a bomb, how will they deliver it? UPS? If Iran is not only capable of building a Bomb what can be done to stop them from completing it?
Let’s look at the facts….
A middle of the road view by both the American Department of Defense and the British Office of Special Operations believe that Iran is probably a little less than a decade away from developing a nuclear weapon. That is unless they receive help from an outside source.
The core issue is how long it will take Iran to enrich a few tens of kilograms of uranium to more than 90 percent U-235. Dafna Linzer reported that the US Intelligence Community does not believe that Iran could do so before “early to mid next decade” A questionable revision of previous assessments by the Bush Administration. Previously, it was believed that Iran would “have the ability to produce nuclear weapons in the later part of this decade.” Why the wait? The answer is that Iran has yet to build, install and begin operating its centrifuges to enrich Uranium. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein at the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) released an estimate that breaks down the steps for Iran to make fissile material for a bomb.
Hurdles in Building a Centrifuge Plant
A key part of the development of Iran’s gas centrifuge program is the operation of a 164-machine cascade at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Facility (PFEP) at Natanz, Iran. The installation of the first such test cascade was finished in the fall of 2003 but it never operated with uranium hexafluoride prior to the start of the suspension in November of 2003. It was not operated during the suspension. Until the start of the suspension, Iran had used uranium hexafluoride in single machine tests and a small cascade of 19 machines. Several of these tests encountered problems.
To operate this cascade at the pilot facility, Iran needs to take several steps before it can introduce uranium hexafluoride into the system. It first has to repair or replace any damaged centrifuges. According to IAEA reports, about 30% of the centrifuges crashed or broke when the cascade was shut down at the start of the suspension. In addition, Iran disconnected some of the pipes and exposed the pipes to humidity which could have caused corrosion. After making necessary repairs, Iran then has to finish connecting all the pipes, establish a vacuum inside the cascade, start the process of turning on the centrifuges and then running them under vacuum for several weeks, and prepare the cascade for operation with uranium hexafluoride. Iran may start enriching uranium in a subset of this cascade sooner, but it could take two or more months to ready the whole cascade for the use of uranium hexafluoride. If Iran does not encounter any significant problems, such as excessive vibration of the centrifuges or leakage of the vacuum, Iran could then introduce uranium hexafluoride into the entire cascade and start enriching uranium. Iran would want to operate the cascade for several more months to ensure that no significant problems develop and gain confidence that it can operate the cascade with uranium hexafluoride. Absent major problems, Iran will need roughly six months to one year to demonstrate successful operation of this cascade.
Once Iran overcomes the last technical hurdle of operating its test cascade, it can duplicate it and create larger cascades. Iran would then be ready to build a centrifuge plant able to produce significant amounts of enriched uranium either for peaceful purposes or for nuclear weapons.
The PFEP can hold a total of six, 164-machine cascades for a total of about 1000 machines, although Iran may build fewer cascades or change the number of centrifuges per cascade. Without major modifications, this facility is unlikely to be used to make significant amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons.
The Fuel Enrichment Plant
Iran has indicated to the IAEA that it plans to start industrial scale operations soon, which likely means that it plans to install centrifuges or related equipment in the underground buildings of the main Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). Until the end of the suspension, Iran had not installed any centrifuges at the FEP, where it plans eventually to install about 50,000 machines. It plans to install the centrifuges in modules of 3,000 machines that would be designed to produce low enriched uranium for power reactors. In a case where just 1,500 of these centrifuges were installed and optimized to produce HEU, these centrifuges could produce enough highly enriched uranium for about one nuclear weapon per year. When completed, the FEP could be used to produce roughly 500 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium annually. At 15-20 kilograms per weapon, that would be enough for 25-30 nuclear weapons per year.
Time to the Bomb
It is difficult to estimate how long it would take Iran to be able to build its first nuclear weapon, assuming Iran makes such a decision. The key to predicting a timetable is understanding the pace and scope of Iran's gas centrifuge program. Prior to the November 2004 suspension, Iran had an estimated 700 assembled centrifuges that were in good
condition and usable in centrifuge cascade. Also, Iran has enough disassembled parts for more than a thousand additional P-1 centrifuges. At past rates of production, Iran can make and assemble about 70-100 centrifuges per month, and could therefore have a total of 1,300-1,600 centrifuges by late 2006, if they resume centrifuge manufacturing in January 2006. Combining all these centrifuges into cascades, installing control equipment, building feed and withdrawal systems, and testing the plant would take at least another year.
Given another year to make enough HEU for a nuclear weapon and a few more months to convert the uranium into weapon components, Iran could have its first nuclear weapon in 2009. By this time, Iran is assessed to have had sufficient time to prepare the other components of a nuclear weapon, although the weapon may not be deliverable by a ballistic missile.
This result reflects a worst case assessment, and thus is highly uncertain. Though some analysts at the IAEA believe that Iran could assemble centrifuges quicker, other analysts, including those in the US intelligence community, appear to believe that a date of 2009 would be overly optimistic. They believe that Iran is likely to encounter technical difficulties that would significantly delay bringing a centrifuge plant into operation. Factors causing delay include Iran having trouble making so many centrifuges in that time period or it taking longer than expected to overcome difficulties in operating the cascades or building a centrifuge plant. As to Iran being only months away from a bomb are really statements about how close Iran will be once it completes the FEP—something, as you will soon see, that will take a few years.
So, How Long in real world figures?
Iran plans to house about 50,000 centrifues in the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz in order to produce low enriched uranium for a notional civil nuclear power program. The output of a centrifuge is measured in “seperative work units”—a measure of the amount of work required to enrich a given amount (product) uranium. In math:
Separative work per unit of product = V(XP) – V (XW) – F/P *[V(XF) – V(XW)]
V(S) = (2*S – 100) * LOG (S/(100-S)]
F/P = (XP- XW)/(XF-XW), where
XF = feed assay (W/O)XP = product assay (W/O)XW = tails assay (W/O)V = separation potentialS = XF, XP, or XWF/P = feed to product ratio
So, how much SWU is required to produce 25 kg of HEU (a few thousand depending on some technical factors). Each of Iran’s centrifuges has an output between 2-3 SWU/year. Iran plans a that the full scale FEP at Natanz will house 50,000 centrifuges, giving the plant a capacity of 150,000 SWU/year—enough for annual reloads of LEU for the Bushehr reactor. So the answer in laymens terms is 25-30 nuclear weapons worth of HEU material per production year.
Of course, those are Iran’s “admitted” physical assets and production capabilities. The United States C.I.A. believes that Iran is closer to possessing about 700+ centrifuges, as well as components for another 1,000.
So, the real question, however, is how quickly Iran could assemble and operate 1,500 centrifuges in a crash program to make enough HEU for one bomb (say 15-20 kg).
Albright and Hinderstein have created a notional timeline for such a program:
1) Assemble 1,300-1,600 centrifuges. Assuming Iran starts assembling centrifuges at a rate of 70-100/month, Iran will have enough centrifuges in 6-9 months.
2)Combine centrifuges into cascades, install control equipment, building feed and withdrawal systems, and test the Fuel Enrichment Plant. 1 year
3)Enrich enough HEU for a nuclear weapon. 1 year
4)Weaponize the HEU. A “few” months.
If Iran receives no help and is NOT hindered in anyway by the International community total time to a fully functioning Nuclear bomb is about three years. This timeline is a worst case scenario which assumes Iran encounters no significant material or scientific problems along the way.
Let’s examine some of the problems Iran may run into
One technical problem—the inability of Iran to make relatively pure uranium hexafluoride (“hex”) to be fed into centrifuges for enrichment. Before introducing UF6 into a centrifuge cascade, the Iranians must rid the gas of impurities like MoF6 or the impurities will plug cascade piping, crashing Iran’s centrifuges. Iran is having a big problem purifying hex at its Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) near Esfahan, Iran’s inability at making hex in part because the Clinton Administration convinced the Chinese to stop building the UCF. Dr Mohammad Saeidi, AEOI deputy for planning and international affairs, stated that the impact of the Chinese cut-off was a knee-blow to Iran’s Nuclear program. Iran also has had significant problems in the area of utilizing pulse columns to purify uranium.
The length of time it will take Iran to get it’s act together on these important technical issues is up in the air. There is a wide variety of estimates among intelligence services. Intelligence analysts do not agree on how long it will take Iran to solve current process chemical problems at its restarted Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Isfahan.
These difficulties have thus far prevented Iran from producing uncontaminated uranium hexafluoride (UF6) feedstock for its gas centrifuge enrichment program. Last month, as Iran prepared to operate the plant, Vienna officials said that Iran would require “at least several months” to address its problems (NF, 15 Aug., 1).
According to Israeli government analysts now examining related technical issues, it may take Iran two or three months to begin producing pure UF6. According to U.K. government experts, however, Iran may need about 18 months to do that.
One thing government analysts do agree on, is that the higher the enrichment level sought by Iran from its gas centrifuges, the more critical it will be for Iran to first eliminate technical problems associated with producing pure UF6. Despite sound bite hysteria Iran faces a serious number of technical hurdles before it can simply start churning out fissile material. Those real world challenges are going to years to solve.
The real ‘Wild Card’ in this mix has to be the Russian factor
The Russian government presently has a proposal on the table which would have Iran transfer to Russia its uranium for enrichment. However, this process can be used to make weapons-grade nuclear fuel. Under the Russian proposal, Iran would be allowed to continue to convert uranium ore at it’s Isfahan facility provided it then shipped it to Russia for enrichment.
The problem with this is that the Russians have also agreed to sell more than $1 billion worth of missiles and other defense systems to Iran. When interviewed by the Russian Tass news agency the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Mikhail Kamynin, did not comment on specifics, saying in a statement only that they were "exclusively defensive weapons." Kamynin also added that the sales fully complied with nonproliferation commitments and Russian law. Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council stated that "Iran's and Russia's military cooperation is not a complicated issue. We are two sovereign nations engaged in combating US aggression."
The Iranians have officially downplayed the deal, telling the Islamic Republic News Agency on Saturday that Iran buys arms from many countries and would not under any circumstances stop.
What is known is that in November 2005 the Russian air Defense Ministry would transfer up to 30 Tor-M1 missile systems to Iran over the next two years. The C.I.A. has said the Tor-M1 system could identify up to 48 targets and fire at two targets simultaneously at a height of up to 20,000 feet. This specific surface to air weapon system is not capable of becoming a delivery vehicle for any Nuclear weapons systems. It is however the perfect weapon system for deterring U.S., Israeli, and European Union air strikes. With this Surface to Air (SAM) capabilities the Iranian Nuclear bomb program could go forward without any real threat of being shut down by air strikes. The Iranians know with this vital lynch pin removed the American arsenal an armed military response is unlikely. Any coalition response after the delivery of the Russian made Surface to Air missiles would have to include some type of armed invasion. This is something that both the E.U. and the American public have stated publicly would NOT support.
Delivery capability of the Iranians
Tehran has a large number of short range ballistic missiles (100-500 km range) like the CSS-8, Scud module B and Scud module C. Each can carry heavy payloads and reach targets very close to Iran. Though, they are famously inaccurate even for nuclear weapons.
Iran’s long range missiles which are capable of hitting American, Canadian, and the European continent, is the Shahab 3. The long range Shahab 3 missile is essentially an extended-range (1,300) version of the North Korean Na Dong missile. The American C.I.A. believes that Iran is most certainly developing an even longer range (2,000) km module B version the Na Dong missile. The Shahab-3 will be capable of carrying a 1,650-pound warhead; the Shahab-4 will include improved guidance components and can travel up to 1,240 miles with a warhead weighing up to 2,200 pounds.
The payload capacity is an very important factor is a ‘crash’ program such as Iran is under taking. Since we are talking about a crash program here—let’s assume that whatever Iran builds will not be tested except under what we might call “operational circumstances.”
Iran’s nuclear program is based around uranium, which can be made critical either by slamming a uranium pellet into a nearly critical mass of uranium (a gun-type device like we dropped on Hiroshima) or imploding sphere of uranium (like the Chinese did in the 1960s). The latter is the more likely route for a number of reasons, largely related to the size of the weapon. Since we are talking about a ballistic missile delivered weapon, let’s assume Iran goes the implosion route.
If past results are the benchmark then the most likely scenario of a new state producing it’s first (WMD) uranium based weapon would be a weight of 450-1000 kg, with a far heavier design more likely.
That’s pretty consistent with what we see from other nuclear states in their infancy. For example China’s first bomb—a uranium implosion device—weighed 1550 kg and had to be towed to the tower with a bulldozer.
What’s interesting is the Shahab-4 now has a modified nose section allowing it to hold a larger warhead and thus provide additional room for a nuclear device. Such extra room is vital as Iranian nuclear engineers would face major technical challenges in making the country’s first nuclear weapon light enough and small enough to fit on its existing missiles, particularly without benefit of having conducted full-scale nuclear weapons tests.
Israeli officials have said the larger nose section is capable of separation and visually appears similar to that used on the Russian SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile. “It is not a copy of a known missile but the old Shahab-4 with major-league design changes. It’s clear that the new capability is the work of a team of highly seasoned missile engineers. With all facts pointing to a Russian design team rather than beginners luck,”
As far as current delivery capabilities of Iran to deliver a nuclear weapon, the outside best that Iran could hope for is maybe an Israeli city. Even that would be at the extreme edge of their missile delivery capabilities.
Western/Coalition Intervention
Can the West stop, slow down, or end Iran’s nuclear ambitions by armed intervention? The benchmark to the question would be the Israeli bombing operation conducted against Iraq’s in 1981. That armed intervention was successful in curtailing Iraq’s (WMD) program. Current available data suggests that Iran’s (WMD) production facilities are too spread out to allow a one sortie strike like the one Israel conducted against Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981. While Iran’s facilities are more spread out, there are key assets are highly vulnerable to Coalition air strikes. A properly timed and delivered bombing campaign would most certainly delay Iran’s (WMD) program by a few years.
Though, the time gained by armed intervention would be severely offset by unintended and unseen consequences. Such as partial or complete solidarity of the entire Mid-East Islamo-Fascist regimes which at the present are fractious with in fighting and religious differences.
If the available data bears out and Iran’s (WMD) program is not capable of operation in the seeable future then the case for military interdiction does not bear out. I do believe that the current administration in Iran folded into the modern climate of ‘State-less, Face-less’ terrorism makes an ‘Atomic Iran’ a very scary prospect. Bearing all the facts in mind I do believe that alternative avenues should be sought in stopping Iran from both building and needing an nuclear bomb. One scenario that would be acceptable to the West would be changing the administration in Iran to one more friendly and peace oriented. Another avenue might be economic incentives or sanctions such as has been used with North Korea. Added to that much of Iran’s reactor facilities are not even finished construction.
That might buy some additional time — but for what?
The result will likely be an Iranian nuclear program outside of IAEA safeguards. An Iranian bomb is not, yet, a foregone conclusion. The fact that Iran’s nuclear program has become an hot potato domestic issue points to the existence of doves among the Islamic hardliners. Though as the West continues galvanizing support for an armed response Iran’s hardliners will only push forward the (WMD) bomb program at all costs. This is where economic incentives in the form of carrot and stick talks might be very fruitful.
I believe that an armed incursion at this time is not warranted. Any such action would seriously inhibit the secularists within the Iranian parliament from achieving a less confrontational stance. A more middle of the road approach is the answer from both sides.
Bobby Anding
rebel@acadiacom.net
Atomic Iran....Ya'll
1/20/2006
I wanted to know for myself just how scary is the Iran question? I wanted to know the answer to several questions in relation to an Atomically able Iran. What will it take for Iran to build a Nuclear Bomb? What if Iran already has a bomb, how will they deliver it? UPS? If Iran is not only capable of building a Bomb what can be done to stop them from completing it?
Let’s look at the facts….
A middle of the road view by both the American Department of Defense and the British Office of Special Operations believe that Iran is probably a little less than a decade away from developing a nuclear weapon. That is unless they receive help from an outside source.
The core issue is how long it will take Iran to enrich a few tens of kilograms of uranium to more than 90 percent U-235. Dafna Linzer reported that the US Intelligence Community does not believe that Iran could do so before “early to mid next decade” A questionable revision of previous assessments by the Bush Administration. Previously, it was believed that Iran would “have the ability to produce nuclear weapons in the later part of this decade.” Why the wait? The answer is that Iran has yet to build, install and begin operating its centrifuges to enrich Uranium. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein at the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) released an estimate that breaks down the steps for Iran to make fissile material for a bomb.
Hurdles in Building a Centrifuge Plant
A key part of the development of Iran’s gas centrifuge program is the operation of a 164-machine cascade at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Facility (PFEP) at Natanz, Iran. The installation of the first such test cascade was finished in the fall of 2003 but it never operated with uranium hexafluoride prior to the start of the suspension in November of 2003. It was not operated during the suspension. Until the start of the suspension, Iran had used uranium hexafluoride in single machine tests and a small cascade of 19 machines. Several of these tests encountered problems.
To operate this cascade at the pilot facility, Iran needs to take several steps before it can introduce uranium hexafluoride into the system. It first has to repair or replace any damaged centrifuges. According to IAEA reports, about 30% of the centrifuges crashed or broke when the cascade was shut down at the start of the suspension. In addition, Iran disconnected some of the pipes and exposed the pipes to humidity which could have caused corrosion. After making necessary repairs, Iran then has to finish connecting all the pipes, establish a vacuum inside the cascade, start the process of turning on the centrifuges and then running them under vacuum for several weeks, and prepare the cascade for operation with uranium hexafluoride. Iran may start enriching uranium in a subset of this cascade sooner, but it could take two or more months to ready the whole cascade for the use of uranium hexafluoride. If Iran does not encounter any significant problems, such as excessive vibration of the centrifuges or leakage of the vacuum, Iran could then introduce uranium hexafluoride into the entire cascade and start enriching uranium. Iran would want to operate the cascade for several more months to ensure that no significant problems develop and gain confidence that it can operate the cascade with uranium hexafluoride. Absent major problems, Iran will need roughly six months to one year to demonstrate successful operation of this cascade.
Once Iran overcomes the last technical hurdle of operating its test cascade, it can duplicate it and create larger cascades. Iran would then be ready to build a centrifuge plant able to produce significant amounts of enriched uranium either for peaceful purposes or for nuclear weapons.
The PFEP can hold a total of six, 164-machine cascades for a total of about 1000 machines, although Iran may build fewer cascades or change the number of centrifuges per cascade. Without major modifications, this facility is unlikely to be used to make significant amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons.
The Fuel Enrichment Plant
Iran has indicated to the IAEA that it plans to start industrial scale operations soon, which likely means that it plans to install centrifuges or related equipment in the underground buildings of the main Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). Until the end of the suspension, Iran had not installed any centrifuges at the FEP, where it plans eventually to install about 50,000 machines. It plans to install the centrifuges in modules of 3,000 machines that would be designed to produce low enriched uranium for power reactors. In a case where just 1,500 of these centrifuges were installed and optimized to produce HEU, these centrifuges could produce enough highly enriched uranium for about one nuclear weapon per year. When completed, the FEP could be used to produce roughly 500 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium annually. At 15-20 kilograms per weapon, that would be enough for 25-30 nuclear weapons per year.
Time to the Bomb
It is difficult to estimate how long it would take Iran to be able to build its first nuclear weapon, assuming Iran makes such a decision. The key to predicting a timetable is understanding the pace and scope of Iran's gas centrifuge program. Prior to the November 2004 suspension, Iran had an estimated 700 assembled centrifuges that were in good
condition and usable in centrifuge cascade. Also, Iran has enough disassembled parts for more than a thousand additional P-1 centrifuges. At past rates of production, Iran can make and assemble about 70-100 centrifuges per month, and could therefore have a total of 1,300-1,600 centrifuges by late 2006, if they resume centrifuge manufacturing in January 2006. Combining all these centrifuges into cascades, installing control equipment, building feed and withdrawal systems, and testing the plant would take at least another year.
Given another year to make enough HEU for a nuclear weapon and a few more months to convert the uranium into weapon components, Iran could have its first nuclear weapon in 2009. By this time, Iran is assessed to have had sufficient time to prepare the other components of a nuclear weapon, although the weapon may not be deliverable by a ballistic missile.
This result reflects a worst case assessment, and thus is highly uncertain. Though some analysts at the IAEA believe that Iran could assemble centrifuges quicker, other analysts, including those in the US intelligence community, appear to believe that a date of 2009 would be overly optimistic. They believe that Iran is likely to encounter technical difficulties that would significantly delay bringing a centrifuge plant into operation. Factors causing delay include Iran having trouble making so many centrifuges in that time period or it taking longer than expected to overcome difficulties in operating the cascades or building a centrifuge plant. As to Iran being only months away from a bomb are really statements about how close Iran will be once it completes the FEP—something, as you will soon see, that will take a few years.
So, How Long in real world figures?
Iran plans to house about 50,000 centrifues in the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz in order to produce low enriched uranium for a notional civil nuclear power program. The output of a centrifuge is measured in “seperative work units”—a measure of the amount of work required to enrich a given amount (product) uranium.
In mathmatical languge:
Separative work per unit of product = V(XP) – V (XW) – F/P *[V(XF) – V(XW)]
V(S) = (2*S – 100) * LOG (S/(100-S)] F/P = (XP- XW)/(XF-XW), where
XF = feed assay (W/O)XP = product assay (W/O)XW = tails assay (W/O)V = separation potentialS = XF, XP, or XWF/P = feed to product ratio .
So, how much SWU is required to produce 25 kg of HEU (a few thousand depending on some technical factors). Each of Iran’s centrifuges has an output between 2-3 SWU/year. Iran plans a that the full scale FEP at Natanz will house 50,000 centrifuges, giving the plant a capacity of 150,000 SWU/year—enough for annual reloads of LEU for the Bushehr reactor. So the answer in laymens terms is 25-30 nuclear weapons worth of HEU material per production year.
Of course, those are Iran’s “admitted” physical assets and production capabilities. The United States C.I.A. believes that Iran is closer to possessing about 700+ centrifuges, as well as components for another 1,000.
So, the real question, however, is how quickly Iran could assemble and operate 1,500 centrifuges in a crash program to make enough HEU for one bomb (say 15-20 kg).
Albright and Hinderstein have created a notional timeline for such a program:
1) Assemble 1,300-1,600 centrifuges. Assuming Iran starts assembling centrifuges at a rate of 70-100/month, Iran will have enough centrifuges in 6-9 months.
2)Combine centrifuges into cascades, install control equipment, building feed and withdrawal systems, and test the Fuel Enrichment Plant. 1 year
3)Enrich enough HEU for a nuclear weapon. 1 year
4)Weaponize the HEU. A “few” months.
If Iran receives no help and is NOT hindered in anyway by the International community total time to a fully functioning Nuclear bomb is about three years. This timeline is a worst case scenario which assumes Iran encounters no significant material or scientific problems along the way.
Problems Iran may run into:
One technical problem—the inability of Iran to make relatively pure uranium hexafluoride (“hex”) to be fed into centrifuges for enrichment. Before introducing UF6 into a centrifuge cascade, the Iranians must rid the gas of impurities like MoF6 or the impurities will plug cascade piping, crashing Iran’s centrifuges. Iran is having a big problem purifying hex at its Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) near Esfahan, Iran’s inability at making hex in part because the Clinton Administration convinced the Chinese to stop building the UCF. Dr Mohammad Saeidi, AEOI deputy for planning and international affairs, stated that the impact of the Chinese cut-off was a knee-blow to Iran’s Nuclear program. Iran also has had significant problems in the area of utilizing pulse columns to purify uranium.
The length of time it will take Iran to get it’s act together on these important technical issues is up in the air. There is a wide variety of estimates among intelligence services. Intelligence analysts do not agree on how long it will take Iran to solve current process chemical problems at its restarted Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Isfahan.
These difficulties have thus far prevented Iran from producing uncontaminated uranium hexafluoride (UF6) feedstock for its gas centrifuge enrichment program. Last month, as Iran prepared to operate the plant, Vienna officials said that Iran would require “at least several months” to address its problems (NF, 15 Aug., 1).
According to Israeli government analysts now examining related technical issues, it may take Iran two or three months to begin producing pure UF6. According to U.K. government experts, however, Iran may need about 18 months to do that.
One thing government analysts do agree on, is that the higher the enrichment level sought by Iran from its gas centrifuges, the more critical it will be for Iran to first eliminate technical problems associated with producing pure UF6. Despite sound bite hysteria Iran faces a serious number of technical hurdles before it can simply start churning out fissile material. Those real world challenges are going to years to solve.
The real ‘Wild Card’ in this mix has to be the Russian factor
The Russian government presently has a proposal on the table which would have Iran transfer to Russia its uranium for enrichment. However, this process can be used to make weapons-grade nuclear fuel. Under the Russian proposal, Iran would be allowed to continue to convert uranium ore at it’s Isfahan facility provided it then shipped it to Russia for enrichment.
The problem with this is that the Russians have also agreed to sell more than $1 billion worth of missiles and other defense systems to Iran. When interviewed by the Russian Tass news agency the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Mikhail Kamynin, did not comment on specifics, saying in a statement only that they were "exclusively defensive weapons." Kamynin also added that the sales fully complied with nonproliferation commitments and Russian law. Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council stated that "Iran's and Russia's military cooperation is not a complicated issue. We are two sovereign nations engaged in combating US aggression."
The Iranians have officially downplayed the deal, telling the Islamic Republic News Agency on Saturday that Iran buys arms from many countries and would not under any circumstances stop.
What is known is that in November 2005 the Russian air Defense Ministry would transfer up to 30 Tor-M1 missile systems to Iran over the next two years. The C.I.A. has said the Tor-M1 system could identify up to 48 targets and fire at two targets simultaneously at a height of up to 20,000 feet. This specific surface to air weapon system is not capable of becoming a delivery vehicle for any Nuclear weapons systems. It is however the perfect weapon system for deterring U.S., Israeli, and European Union air strikes. With this Surface to Air (SAM) capabilities the Iranian Nuclear bomb program could go forward without any real threat of being shut down by air strikes. The Iranians know with this vital lynch pin removed the American arsenal an armed military response is unlikely. Any coalition response after the delivery of the Russian made Surface to Air missiles would have to include some type of armed invasion. This is something that both the E.U. and the American public have stated publicly would NOT support.
Delivery capability of the Iranians
Tehran has a large number of short range ballistic missiles (100-500 km range) like the CSS-8, Scud module B and Scud module C. Each can carry heavy payloads and reach targets very close to Iran. Though, they are famously inaccurate even for nuclear weapons.
Iran’s long range missiles which are capable of hitting American, Canadian, and the European continent, is the Shahab 3. The long range Shahab 3 missile is essentially an extended-range (1,300) version of the North Korean Na Dong missile. The American C.I.A. believes that Iran is most certainly developing an even longer range (2,000) km module B version the Na Dong missile. The Shahab-3 will be capable of carrying a 1,650-pound warhead; the Shahab-4 will include improved guidance components and can travel up to 1,240 miles with a warhead weighing up to 2,200 pounds.
The payload capacity is an very important factor in a ‘crash’ program such as Iran is under taking. Since we are talking about a crash program here—let’s assume that whatever Iran builds will not be tested except under what we might call “operational circumstances.”
Iran’s nuclear program is based around uranium, which can be made critical either by slamming a uranium pellet into a nearly critical mass of uranium (a gun-type device like we dropped on Hiroshima) or imploding sphere of uranium (like the Chinese did in the 1960s). The latter is the more likely route for a number of reasons, largely related to the size of the weapon. Since we are talking about a ballistic missile delivered weapon, let’s assume Iran goes the implosion route.
If past results are the benchmark then the most likely scenario of a new state producing it’s first (WMD) uranium based weapon would be a weight of 450-1000 kg, with a far heavier design more likely. That’s pretty consistent with what we see from other nuclear states in their infancy. For example China’s first bomb—a uranium implosion device—weighed 1550 kg and had to be towed to the tower with a bulldozer.
What’s interesting is the Shahab-4 now has a modified nose section allowing it to hold a larger warhead and thus provide additional room for a nuclear device. Such extra room is vital as Iranian nuclear engineers would face major technical challenges in making the country’s first nuclear weapon light enough and small enough to fit on its existing missiles, particularly without benefit of having conducted full-scale nuclear weapons tests.
Israeli officials have said the larger nose section is capable of separation and visually appears similar to that used on the Russian SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile. “It is not a copy of a known missile but the old Shahab-4 with major-league design changes. It’s clear that the new capability is the work of a team of highly seasoned missile engineers. With all facts pointing to a Russian design team rather than beginners luck.”
As far as current delivery capabilities of Iran to deliver a nuclear weapon, the outside best that Iran could hope for is maybe an Israeli city. Even that would be at the extreme edge of their missile delivery capabilities.
Western/Coalition Armed Intervention
Can the West stop, slow down, or end Iran’s nuclear ambitions by armed intervention? The benchmark to the question would be the Israeli bombing operation conducted against Iraq’s in 1981. That armed intervention was successful in curtailing Iraq’s (WMD) program. Current available data suggests that Iran’s (WMD) production facilities are too spread out to allow a one sortie strike like the one Israel conducted against Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981. While Iran’s facilities are more spread out, there are key assets are highly vulnerable to Coalition air strikes. A properly timed and delivered bombing campaign would most certainly delay Iran’s (WMD) program by a few years.
Though, the time gained by armed intervention would be severely offset by unintended and unseen consequences. The result will likely be an Iranian nuclear program outside of IAEA safeguards. An Iranian bomb is not, yet, a foregone conclusion. The fact that Iran’s nuclear program has become an hot potato domestic issue points to the existence of doves among the Islamic hardliners. Though as the West continues galvanizing support for an armed response Iran’s hardliners will only push forward the (WMD) bomb program at all costs. Such as partial or complete solidarity of the entire Mid-East Islamo-Fascist regimes which at the present are fractious with in fighting and religious differences.
If the available data bears out and Iran’s (WMD) program is not capable of operation in the seeable future then the case for military interdiction does not bear out.
I do believe that the current administration in Iran folded into the modern climate of ‘State-less, Face-less’ terrorism makes an ‘Atomic Iran’ a very scary prospect.
Bearing all the facts in mind I do believe that alternative avenues should be sought in stopping Iran from both building and needing an nuclear bomb. One scenario that would be acceptable to the West would be changing the administration in Iran to one more friendly and peace oriented. Another avenue might be economic incentives or sanctions such as has been used with North Korea. Added to that much of Iran’s reactor facilities are not even finished construction.
That might buy some additional time — but for what?
This is where economic incentives in the form of carrot and stick talks might be very fruitful.
I believe that an armed incursion at this time is not warranted. Any such action would seriously inhibit the secularists within the Iranian parliament from achieving a less confrontational stance.
A more middle of the road approach is the answer from both sides....
Bobby Anding
rebel@acadiacom.net
I wanted to know for myself just how scary is the Iran question? I wanted to know the answer to several questions in relation to an Atomically able Iran. What will it take for Iran to build a Nuclear Bomb? What if Iran already has a bomb, how will they deliver it? UPS? If Iran is not only capable of building a Bomb what can be done to stop them from completing it?
Let’s look at the facts….
A middle of the road view by both the American Department of Defense and the British Office of Special Operations believe that Iran is probably a little less than a decade away from developing a nuclear weapon. That is unless they receive help from an outside source.
The core issue is how long it will take Iran to enrich a few tens of kilograms of uranium to more than 90 percent U-235. Dafna Linzer reported that the US Intelligence Community does not believe that Iran could do so before “early to mid next decade” A questionable revision of previous assessments by the Bush Administration. Previously, it was believed that Iran would “have the ability to produce nuclear weapons in the later part of this decade.” Why the wait? The answer is that Iran has yet to build, install and begin operating its centrifuges to enrich Uranium. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein at the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) released an estimate that breaks down the steps for Iran to make fissile material for a bomb.
Hurdles in Building a Centrifuge Plant
A key part of the development of Iran’s gas centrifuge program is the operation of a 164-machine cascade at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Facility (PFEP) at Natanz, Iran. The installation of the first such test cascade was finished in the fall of 2003 but it never operated with uranium hexafluoride prior to the start of the suspension in November of 2003. It was not operated during the suspension. Until the start of the suspension, Iran had used uranium hexafluoride in single machine tests and a small cascade of 19 machines. Several of these tests encountered problems.
To operate this cascade at the pilot facility, Iran needs to take several steps before it can introduce uranium hexafluoride into the system. It first has to repair or replace any damaged centrifuges. According to IAEA reports, about 30% of the centrifuges crashed or broke when the cascade was shut down at the start of the suspension. In addition, Iran disconnected some of the pipes and exposed the pipes to humidity which could have caused corrosion. After making necessary repairs, Iran then has to finish connecting all the pipes, establish a vacuum inside the cascade, start the process of turning on the centrifuges and then running them under vacuum for several weeks, and prepare the cascade for operation with uranium hexafluoride. Iran may start enriching uranium in a subset of this cascade sooner, but it could take two or more months to ready the whole cascade for the use of uranium hexafluoride. If Iran does not encounter any significant problems, such as excessive vibration of the centrifuges or leakage of the vacuum, Iran could then introduce uranium hexafluoride into the entire cascade and start enriching uranium. Iran would want to operate the cascade for several more months to ensure that no significant problems develop and gain confidence that it can operate the cascade with uranium hexafluoride. Absent major problems, Iran will need roughly six months to one year to demonstrate successful operation of this cascade.
Once Iran overcomes the last technical hurdle of operating its test cascade, it can duplicate it and create larger cascades. Iran would then be ready to build a centrifuge plant able to produce significant amounts of enriched uranium either for peaceful purposes or for nuclear weapons.
The PFEP can hold a total of six, 164-machine cascades for a total of about 1000 machines, although Iran may build fewer cascades or change the number of centrifuges per cascade. Without major modifications, this facility is unlikely to be used to make significant amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons.
The Fuel Enrichment Plant
Iran has indicated to the IAEA that it plans to start industrial scale operations soon, which likely means that it plans to install centrifuges or related equipment in the underground buildings of the main Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). Until the end of the suspension, Iran had not installed any centrifuges at the FEP, where it plans eventually to install about 50,000 machines. It plans to install the centrifuges in modules of 3,000 machines that would be designed to produce low enriched uranium for power reactors. In a case where just 1,500 of these centrifuges were installed and optimized to produce HEU, these centrifuges could produce enough highly enriched uranium for about one nuclear weapon per year. When completed, the FEP could be used to produce roughly 500 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium annually. At 15-20 kilograms per weapon, that would be enough for 25-30 nuclear weapons per year.
Time to the Bomb
It is difficult to estimate how long it would take Iran to be able to build its first nuclear weapon, assuming Iran makes such a decision. The key to predicting a timetable is understanding the pace and scope of Iran's gas centrifuge program. Prior to the November 2004 suspension, Iran had an estimated 700 assembled centrifuges that were in good
condition and usable in centrifuge cascade. Also, Iran has enough disassembled parts for more than a thousand additional P-1 centrifuges. At past rates of production, Iran can make and assemble about 70-100 centrifuges per month, and could therefore have a total of 1,300-1,600 centrifuges by late 2006, if they resume centrifuge manufacturing in January 2006. Combining all these centrifuges into cascades, installing control equipment, building feed and withdrawal systems, and testing the plant would take at least another year.
Given another year to make enough HEU for a nuclear weapon and a few more months to convert the uranium into weapon components, Iran could have its first nuclear weapon in 2009. By this time, Iran is assessed to have had sufficient time to prepare the other components of a nuclear weapon, although the weapon may not be deliverable by a ballistic missile.
This result reflects a worst case assessment, and thus is highly uncertain. Though some analysts at the IAEA believe that Iran could assemble centrifuges quicker, other analysts, including those in the US intelligence community, appear to believe that a date of 2009 would be overly optimistic. They believe that Iran is likely to encounter technical difficulties that would significantly delay bringing a centrifuge plant into operation. Factors causing delay include Iran having trouble making so many centrifuges in that time period or it taking longer than expected to overcome difficulties in operating the cascades or building a centrifuge plant. As to Iran being only months away from a bomb are really statements about how close Iran will be once it completes the FEP—something, as you will soon see, that will take a few years.
So, How Long in real world figures?
Iran plans to house about 50,000 centrifues in the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz in order to produce low enriched uranium for a notional civil nuclear power program. The output of a centrifuge is measured in “seperative work units”—a measure of the amount of work required to enrich a given amount (product) uranium.
In mathmatical languge:
Separative work per unit of product = V(XP) – V (XW) – F/P *[V(XF) – V(XW)]
V(S) = (2*S – 100) * LOG (S/(100-S)] F/P = (XP- XW)/(XF-XW), where
XF = feed assay (W/O)XP = product assay (W/O)XW = tails assay (W/O)V = separation potentialS = XF, XP, or XWF/P = feed to product ratio .
So, how much SWU is required to produce 25 kg of HEU (a few thousand depending on some technical factors). Each of Iran’s centrifuges has an output between 2-3 SWU/year. Iran plans a that the full scale FEP at Natanz will house 50,000 centrifuges, giving the plant a capacity of 150,000 SWU/year—enough for annual reloads of LEU for the Bushehr reactor. So the answer in laymens terms is 25-30 nuclear weapons worth of HEU material per production year.
Of course, those are Iran’s “admitted” physical assets and production capabilities. The United States C.I.A. believes that Iran is closer to possessing about 700+ centrifuges, as well as components for another 1,000.
So, the real question, however, is how quickly Iran could assemble and operate 1,500 centrifuges in a crash program to make enough HEU for one bomb (say 15-20 kg).
Albright and Hinderstein have created a notional timeline for such a program:
1) Assemble 1,300-1,600 centrifuges. Assuming Iran starts assembling centrifuges at a rate of 70-100/month, Iran will have enough centrifuges in 6-9 months.
2)Combine centrifuges into cascades, install control equipment, building feed and withdrawal systems, and test the Fuel Enrichment Plant. 1 year
3)Enrich enough HEU for a nuclear weapon. 1 year
4)Weaponize the HEU. A “few” months.
If Iran receives no help and is NOT hindered in anyway by the International community total time to a fully functioning Nuclear bomb is about three years. This timeline is a worst case scenario which assumes Iran encounters no significant material or scientific problems along the way.
Problems Iran may run into:
One technical problem—the inability of Iran to make relatively pure uranium hexafluoride (“hex”) to be fed into centrifuges for enrichment. Before introducing UF6 into a centrifuge cascade, the Iranians must rid the gas of impurities like MoF6 or the impurities will plug cascade piping, crashing Iran’s centrifuges. Iran is having a big problem purifying hex at its Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) near Esfahan, Iran’s inability at making hex in part because the Clinton Administration convinced the Chinese to stop building the UCF. Dr Mohammad Saeidi, AEOI deputy for planning and international affairs, stated that the impact of the Chinese cut-off was a knee-blow to Iran’s Nuclear program. Iran also has had significant problems in the area of utilizing pulse columns to purify uranium.
The length of time it will take Iran to get it’s act together on these important technical issues is up in the air. There is a wide variety of estimates among intelligence services. Intelligence analysts do not agree on how long it will take Iran to solve current process chemical problems at its restarted Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Isfahan.
These difficulties have thus far prevented Iran from producing uncontaminated uranium hexafluoride (UF6) feedstock for its gas centrifuge enrichment program. Last month, as Iran prepared to operate the plant, Vienna officials said that Iran would require “at least several months” to address its problems (NF, 15 Aug., 1).
According to Israeli government analysts now examining related technical issues, it may take Iran two or three months to begin producing pure UF6. According to U.K. government experts, however, Iran may need about 18 months to do that.
One thing government analysts do agree on, is that the higher the enrichment level sought by Iran from its gas centrifuges, the more critical it will be for Iran to first eliminate technical problems associated with producing pure UF6. Despite sound bite hysteria Iran faces a serious number of technical hurdles before it can simply start churning out fissile material. Those real world challenges are going to years to solve.
The real ‘Wild Card’ in this mix has to be the Russian factor
The Russian government presently has a proposal on the table which would have Iran transfer to Russia its uranium for enrichment. However, this process can be used to make weapons-grade nuclear fuel. Under the Russian proposal, Iran would be allowed to continue to convert uranium ore at it’s Isfahan facility provided it then shipped it to Russia for enrichment.
The problem with this is that the Russians have also agreed to sell more than $1 billion worth of missiles and other defense systems to Iran. When interviewed by the Russian Tass news agency the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Mikhail Kamynin, did not comment on specifics, saying in a statement only that they were "exclusively defensive weapons." Kamynin also added that the sales fully complied with nonproliferation commitments and Russian law. Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council stated that "Iran's and Russia's military cooperation is not a complicated issue. We are two sovereign nations engaged in combating US aggression."
The Iranians have officially downplayed the deal, telling the Islamic Republic News Agency on Saturday that Iran buys arms from many countries and would not under any circumstances stop.
What is known is that in November 2005 the Russian air Defense Ministry would transfer up to 30 Tor-M1 missile systems to Iran over the next two years. The C.I.A. has said the Tor-M1 system could identify up to 48 targets and fire at two targets simultaneously at a height of up to 20,000 feet. This specific surface to air weapon system is not capable of becoming a delivery vehicle for any Nuclear weapons systems. It is however the perfect weapon system for deterring U.S., Israeli, and European Union air strikes. With this Surface to Air (SAM) capabilities the Iranian Nuclear bomb program could go forward without any real threat of being shut down by air strikes. The Iranians know with this vital lynch pin removed the American arsenal an armed military response is unlikely. Any coalition response after the delivery of the Russian made Surface to Air missiles would have to include some type of armed invasion. This is something that both the E.U. and the American public have stated publicly would NOT support.
Delivery capability of the Iranians
Tehran has a large number of short range ballistic missiles (100-500 km range) like the CSS-8, Scud module B and Scud module C. Each can carry heavy payloads and reach targets very close to Iran. Though, they are famously inaccurate even for nuclear weapons.
Iran’s long range missiles which are capable of hitting American, Canadian, and the European continent, is the Shahab 3. The long range Shahab 3 missile is essentially an extended-range (1,300) version of the North Korean Na Dong missile. The American C.I.A. believes that Iran is most certainly developing an even longer range (2,000) km module B version the Na Dong missile. The Shahab-3 will be capable of carrying a 1,650-pound warhead; the Shahab-4 will include improved guidance components and can travel up to 1,240 miles with a warhead weighing up to 2,200 pounds.
The payload capacity is an very important factor in a ‘crash’ program such as Iran is under taking. Since we are talking about a crash program here—let’s assume that whatever Iran builds will not be tested except under what we might call “operational circumstances.”
Iran’s nuclear program is based around uranium, which can be made critical either by slamming a uranium pellet into a nearly critical mass of uranium (a gun-type device like we dropped on Hiroshima) or imploding sphere of uranium (like the Chinese did in the 1960s). The latter is the more likely route for a number of reasons, largely related to the size of the weapon. Since we are talking about a ballistic missile delivered weapon, let’s assume Iran goes the implosion route.
If past results are the benchmark then the most likely scenario of a new state producing it’s first (WMD) uranium based weapon would be a weight of 450-1000 kg, with a far heavier design more likely. That’s pretty consistent with what we see from other nuclear states in their infancy. For example China’s first bomb—a uranium implosion device—weighed 1550 kg and had to be towed to the tower with a bulldozer.
What’s interesting is the Shahab-4 now has a modified nose section allowing it to hold a larger warhead and thus provide additional room for a nuclear device. Such extra room is vital as Iranian nuclear engineers would face major technical challenges in making the country’s first nuclear weapon light enough and small enough to fit on its existing missiles, particularly without benefit of having conducted full-scale nuclear weapons tests.
Israeli officials have said the larger nose section is capable of separation and visually appears similar to that used on the Russian SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile. “It is not a copy of a known missile but the old Shahab-4 with major-league design changes. It’s clear that the new capability is the work of a team of highly seasoned missile engineers. With all facts pointing to a Russian design team rather than beginners luck.”
As far as current delivery capabilities of Iran to deliver a nuclear weapon, the outside best that Iran could hope for is maybe an Israeli city. Even that would be at the extreme edge of their missile delivery capabilities.
Western/Coalition Armed Intervention
Can the West stop, slow down, or end Iran’s nuclear ambitions by armed intervention? The benchmark to the question would be the Israeli bombing operation conducted against Iraq’s in 1981. That armed intervention was successful in curtailing Iraq’s (WMD) program. Current available data suggests that Iran’s (WMD) production facilities are too spread out to allow a one sortie strike like the one Israel conducted against Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981. While Iran’s facilities are more spread out, there are key assets are highly vulnerable to Coalition air strikes. A properly timed and delivered bombing campaign would most certainly delay Iran’s (WMD) program by a few years.
Though, the time gained by armed intervention would be severely offset by unintended and unseen consequences. The result will likely be an Iranian nuclear program outside of IAEA safeguards. An Iranian bomb is not, yet, a foregone conclusion. The fact that Iran’s nuclear program has become an hot potato domestic issue points to the existence of doves among the Islamic hardliners. Though as the West continues galvanizing support for an armed response Iran’s hardliners will only push forward the (WMD) bomb program at all costs. Such as partial or complete solidarity of the entire Mid-East Islamo-Fascist regimes which at the present are fractious with in fighting and religious differences.
If the available data bears out and Iran’s (WMD) program is not capable of operation in the seeable future then the case for military interdiction does not bear out.
I do believe that the current administration in Iran folded into the modern climate of ‘State-less, Face-less’ terrorism makes an ‘Atomic Iran’ a very scary prospect.
Bearing all the facts in mind I do believe that alternative avenues should be sought in stopping Iran from both building and needing an nuclear bomb. One scenario that would be acceptable to the West would be changing the administration in Iran to one more friendly and peace oriented. Another avenue might be economic incentives or sanctions such as has been used with North Korea. Added to that much of Iran’s reactor facilities are not even finished construction.
That might buy some additional time — but for what?
This is where economic incentives in the form of carrot and stick talks might be very fruitful.
I believe that an armed incursion at this time is not warranted. Any such action would seriously inhibit the secularists within the Iranian parliament from achieving a less confrontational stance.
A more middle of the road approach is the answer from both sides....
Bobby Anding
rebel@acadiacom.net
Thursday, January 12, 2006
You say Iran, I say 'Scary'
Dear Reader:
The President of Iran, who has stated that Israel should be wipped off the face of the Earth, now belives that Allah has picked him to usher in the End Times. Take a look at what He and his aides believe happened at his speech at the United Nation. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the President of Israel, has been making headlines lately by questioning whether the Holocaust actually happened, by suggesting Israel should be moved to Europe and by demanding the Jewish state be wiped off the face of the earth. His apocalyptic religious zealotry has increased to very scary levels.
In a videotaped meeting with Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli in Tehran, Ahmadinejad discussed candidly a strange, paranormal experience hehad while addressing the United Nations in New York last September. He recounts how he found himself bathed in heavenly light throughout the speech. However, this wasn't the stage lights directed at the podium by the U.N. television cameras. It was, he stated, a light from heaven.
The Iranian president recalled being told about it by one of his delegation: "When you began with the words ‘in the name of Allah,' I saw a powerful heavenly light surrounding you and protecting you to the end of your speech." After some thought Ahmadinejad agreed that he sensed the same thing.
Can you say..."Meglomanic Delusions" Ahmadinejad went on to say..."On the last day when I was speaking, our group told me that when I started to say "Bismillah Muhammad,they all saw a green light forming around me. I too felt as if I was placed inside this aura," he says. "I felt it myself. I felt that the atmosphere suddenly changed, and for those 27 or 28 minutes, all the leaders of the world did not blink. When I say they didn't move an eyelid, I'm not exaggerating. They were looking as if a hand was holding them there...Praise Alhamdulillah!"
Ahmadinejad's "vision" at the U.N. is strangely reminiscent and alarmingly similar to statements he has publicly made about his personal role in ushering in the return of the Shiite Muslim messiah. He sees his main mission, as he recounted in a Nov. 16 speech in Tehran, as to "pave the path with the blood of the West for the glorious reappearance of Imam Mahdi, may Allah hasten hisreappearance."
According to Shiites, the 12th imam disappeared as a child in theyear 941. When he returns, they believe, he will reign on earth forseven years, before bringing about a final judgment and the end of the world. Ahmadinejad is urging Iranians to prepare for the coming of the Mahdiwhich he believes he is a key player in bringing this about by turning the country's military into a mighty and advanced Islamic war-scrimatar! Shiite writings describe events surrounding the return of the Mahdiin in apocalyptic terms. In one scenario, the forces of evil would come from Syria and Iraq and clash with forces of pure evil from the Western nations in a world ending battle.
The final battle would commence at Kufa – theIraqi town near the holy city of Najaf and would end with the deathof all Westerners. Even more controversial is Ahmadinejad's repeated invocation of ImamMahdi, known as "the Savior of Times." According to Shiite tradition,Imam Mahdi will appear on Judgment Day to herald a truly just Islamic government. Missed by some observers in Ahmadinejad's speech at the U.N. was his call to the "mighty Lord Allah" to hasten the emergence of "the promised one," the one who "will fill this world with justice and peace." A top priority of Ahmadinejad is "to challenge and ultimatly destroyAmerica and all her allies. "Death to the West!" is the most oft used slogan of Ahmadinejad's speeches to the Iranian people.
Bobby Anding
rebel@acadiacom.net
The President of Iran, who has stated that Israel should be wipped off the face of the Earth, now belives that Allah has picked him to usher in the End Times. Take a look at what He and his aides believe happened at his speech at the United Nation. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the President of Israel, has been making headlines lately by questioning whether the Holocaust actually happened, by suggesting Israel should be moved to Europe and by demanding the Jewish state be wiped off the face of the earth. His apocalyptic religious zealotry has increased to very scary levels.
In a videotaped meeting with Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli in Tehran, Ahmadinejad discussed candidly a strange, paranormal experience hehad while addressing the United Nations in New York last September. He recounts how he found himself bathed in heavenly light throughout the speech. However, this wasn't the stage lights directed at the podium by the U.N. television cameras. It was, he stated, a light from heaven.
The Iranian president recalled being told about it by one of his delegation: "When you began with the words ‘in the name of Allah,' I saw a powerful heavenly light surrounding you and protecting you to the end of your speech." After some thought Ahmadinejad agreed that he sensed the same thing.
Can you say..."Meglomanic Delusions" Ahmadinejad went on to say..."On the last day when I was speaking, our group told me that when I started to say "Bismillah Muhammad,they all saw a green light forming around me. I too felt as if I was placed inside this aura," he says. "I felt it myself. I felt that the atmosphere suddenly changed, and for those 27 or 28 minutes, all the leaders of the world did not blink. When I say they didn't move an eyelid, I'm not exaggerating. They were looking as if a hand was holding them there...Praise Alhamdulillah!"
Ahmadinejad's "vision" at the U.N. is strangely reminiscent and alarmingly similar to statements he has publicly made about his personal role in ushering in the return of the Shiite Muslim messiah. He sees his main mission, as he recounted in a Nov. 16 speech in Tehran, as to "pave the path with the blood of the West for the glorious reappearance of Imam Mahdi, may Allah hasten hisreappearance."
According to Shiites, the 12th imam disappeared as a child in theyear 941. When he returns, they believe, he will reign on earth forseven years, before bringing about a final judgment and the end of the world. Ahmadinejad is urging Iranians to prepare for the coming of the Mahdiwhich he believes he is a key player in bringing this about by turning the country's military into a mighty and advanced Islamic war-scrimatar! Shiite writings describe events surrounding the return of the Mahdiin in apocalyptic terms. In one scenario, the forces of evil would come from Syria and Iraq and clash with forces of pure evil from the Western nations in a world ending battle.
The final battle would commence at Kufa – theIraqi town near the holy city of Najaf and would end with the deathof all Westerners. Even more controversial is Ahmadinejad's repeated invocation of ImamMahdi, known as "the Savior of Times." According to Shiite tradition,Imam Mahdi will appear on Judgment Day to herald a truly just Islamic government. Missed by some observers in Ahmadinejad's speech at the U.N. was his call to the "mighty Lord Allah" to hasten the emergence of "the promised one," the one who "will fill this world with justice and peace." A top priority of Ahmadinejad is "to challenge and ultimatly destroyAmerica and all her allies. "Death to the West!" is the most oft used slogan of Ahmadinejad's speeches to the Iranian people.
Bobby Anding
rebel@acadiacom.net
The End of the World begins and ends with IRAN
Dear Readers...
U.S. Def. Dept. insiders are saying that a first strike nuclear waragainst Iran in the final planning stages.U.S. led Coalition partners, which include the US, Israel and Turkeyare stating publicly that they are in "an advanced stage ofreadiness". This is seen by some as saber rattling but to others inthe know this is no idle threat. A DOD insider states off recordthat "Things have become very serious."
In early 2005 various military exercises have been conductedconcering the 'IRAN Issue.' In turn, the Iranian Armed Forces havealso conducted large scale military maneuvers in the Persian Gulf inDecember in anticipation of a US sponsored attack.
Since late 2004, there has been intense shuttle diplomacy between Washington, Tel Aviv, Ankara and NATO headquarters in BrusselsIn recent developments, CIA Director Porter Goss on a mission toAnkara, requested Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan "toprovide political and logistic support for air strikes againstIranian nuclear and military targets." Goss reportedly asked " forspecial cooperation from Turkish intelligence to help prepare andmonitor the operation." (DDP, 30 December 2005).In turn, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has given the green light to theIsraeli Armed Forces to launch the attacks by the end of March.
A more recent event, Sharon being sidelined by a massive stroke, mayhave given Iran a small meause of breathing room. Insider sources sayhowever that even with Sharon being side lined the matter has gainedto much momentum to be halted by Sharon's absence. All top Israeli officials have pronounced a desire for the the end ofMarch, 2006, as being the deadline for launching a military assaulton Iran. The end of March date also coincides with the IAEA report to the UNon Iran's nuclear energy program. Israeli policymakers believe thattheir threats may influence the report, or at least force the kind ofambiguities, which can be exploited by its overseas supporters topromote Security Council sanctions or justify Israeli military action.(James Petras, Israel's War Deadline: Iran in the Crosshairs, GlobalResearch, December 2005)
As to who will lead the military coalition it has been reported bythe U.S. DOD that the various components of the military operationare firmly under US Command, coordinated by the Pentagon and USStrategic Command Headquarters (USSTRATCOM) at the Offutt Air Forcebase in Nebraska. To prove to both the world and the Iranian Military Higherarchy thatthe USA is both capable and ready for a Nuclear War, in November, theUS Strategic Command conducted a major exercise of a "global strikeplan" entitled "Global Lightening". The excersice involved asimulated attack using both conventional and nuclear weapons againsta "fictious enemy".Following the "Global Lightening" exercise, US Strategic Commanddeclared an advanced state of readiness. This has been seen on the world stage as a last ditch effort by the Doves within the USgoverment to send a message to the Iranian president that the US is indeed prepared to go to war.
Further pointing to an inevitable confict over the Nuclear issue isthe fact that no dissenting political voices have emerged from withinthe European Union. There are ongoing consultations between Washington, Paris and Berlin.Contrary to the invasion of Iraq, which was opposed at the diplomaticlevel by France and Germany, Washington has been building "a consensus" both within the Atlantic Alliance and the UN SecurityCouncil. This consensus pertains to the conduct of a nuclear war,which could potentially affect a large part of the Middle EastCentral Asian region.
Further evidence is the fact that since late 2004, Israel has beenstockpiling US made conventional and nuclear weapons systems inanticipation of an attack on Iran. This stockpiling which is financedby US military aid was largely completed in June 2005. Israel hastaken delivery from the US of several thousand "smart air launchedweapons" including some 500 'bunker-buster bombs, which can also beused to deliver tactical nuclear bombs.
The Iranian military has not been blind to the weapons build up byboth the Us and Isreal. Tehran has beefed up its air defenses throughthe acquisition of Russian 29 Tor M-1 anti-missile systems. Tehranhas confirmed that it will retaliate if attacked, in the form ofballistic missile strikes directed against Israel (CNN, 8 Feb 2005).These attacks, would also target US military facilities in Iraq andPersian Gulf, which would immediately lead us into a scenario ofmilitary escalation and all out war.
What seems inevitable, is only so, ' If Good Men do Nothing!'
What isneeded if peace and common sense is to win the day is a major thrust,nationally and internationally towards a more middle of the roadapproach to stopping both Iran and North Korea from using their only ACE card in the game of International Politics. If this does not occur then we may be seeing the opening stages ofWWIII shortly.
Bobby Anding
rebel@acadiacom.net
U.S. Def. Dept. insiders are saying that a first strike nuclear waragainst Iran in the final planning stages.U.S. led Coalition partners, which include the US, Israel and Turkeyare stating publicly that they are in "an advanced stage ofreadiness". This is seen by some as saber rattling but to others inthe know this is no idle threat. A DOD insider states off recordthat "Things have become very serious."
In early 2005 various military exercises have been conductedconcering the 'IRAN Issue.' In turn, the Iranian Armed Forces havealso conducted large scale military maneuvers in the Persian Gulf inDecember in anticipation of a US sponsored attack.
Since late 2004, there has been intense shuttle diplomacy between Washington, Tel Aviv, Ankara and NATO headquarters in BrusselsIn recent developments, CIA Director Porter Goss on a mission toAnkara, requested Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan "toprovide political and logistic support for air strikes againstIranian nuclear and military targets." Goss reportedly asked " forspecial cooperation from Turkish intelligence to help prepare andmonitor the operation." (DDP, 30 December 2005).In turn, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has given the green light to theIsraeli Armed Forces to launch the attacks by the end of March.
A more recent event, Sharon being sidelined by a massive stroke, mayhave given Iran a small meause of breathing room. Insider sources sayhowever that even with Sharon being side lined the matter has gainedto much momentum to be halted by Sharon's absence. All top Israeli officials have pronounced a desire for the the end ofMarch, 2006, as being the deadline for launching a military assaulton Iran. The end of March date also coincides with the IAEA report to the UNon Iran's nuclear energy program. Israeli policymakers believe thattheir threats may influence the report, or at least force the kind ofambiguities, which can be exploited by its overseas supporters topromote Security Council sanctions or justify Israeli military action.(James Petras, Israel's War Deadline: Iran in the Crosshairs, GlobalResearch, December 2005)
As to who will lead the military coalition it has been reported bythe U.S. DOD that the various components of the military operationare firmly under US Command, coordinated by the Pentagon and USStrategic Command Headquarters (USSTRATCOM) at the Offutt Air Forcebase in Nebraska. To prove to both the world and the Iranian Military Higherarchy thatthe USA is both capable and ready for a Nuclear War, in November, theUS Strategic Command conducted a major exercise of a "global strikeplan" entitled "Global Lightening". The excersice involved asimulated attack using both conventional and nuclear weapons againsta "fictious enemy".Following the "Global Lightening" exercise, US Strategic Commanddeclared an advanced state of readiness. This has been seen on the world stage as a last ditch effort by the Doves within the USgoverment to send a message to the Iranian president that the US is indeed prepared to go to war.
Further pointing to an inevitable confict over the Nuclear issue isthe fact that no dissenting political voices have emerged from withinthe European Union. There are ongoing consultations between Washington, Paris and Berlin.Contrary to the invasion of Iraq, which was opposed at the diplomaticlevel by France and Germany, Washington has been building "a consensus" both within the Atlantic Alliance and the UN SecurityCouncil. This consensus pertains to the conduct of a nuclear war,which could potentially affect a large part of the Middle EastCentral Asian region.
Further evidence is the fact that since late 2004, Israel has beenstockpiling US made conventional and nuclear weapons systems inanticipation of an attack on Iran. This stockpiling which is financedby US military aid was largely completed in June 2005. Israel hastaken delivery from the US of several thousand "smart air launchedweapons" including some 500 'bunker-buster bombs, which can also beused to deliver tactical nuclear bombs.
The Iranian military has not been blind to the weapons build up byboth the Us and Isreal. Tehran has beefed up its air defenses throughthe acquisition of Russian 29 Tor M-1 anti-missile systems. Tehranhas confirmed that it will retaliate if attacked, in the form ofballistic missile strikes directed against Israel (CNN, 8 Feb 2005).These attacks, would also target US military facilities in Iraq andPersian Gulf, which would immediately lead us into a scenario ofmilitary escalation and all out war.
What seems inevitable, is only so, ' If Good Men do Nothing!'
What isneeded if peace and common sense is to win the day is a major thrust,nationally and internationally towards a more middle of the roadapproach to stopping both Iran and North Korea from using their only ACE card in the game of International Politics. If this does not occur then we may be seeing the opening stages ofWWIII shortly.
Bobby Anding
rebel@acadiacom.net
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